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Abstract 
 
Title:  Understanding the Swedish Venture Capital market – and what 
determines the success of investments 
Course:  BUSP70 
Authors:  Anton Norrman and Viktor Savén 
Keywords: Venture Capital, Exit determinants, Swedish Venture Capital 
market, Private VC, Governmental VC, clusters, proximity, high 
growth industry,  investment duration 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate if and how 
characteristics of the Swedish VC industry affect the exit outcome 
in VC investments 
Methodology: A quantitative approach using a binary logistic regression model 
supported by marginal effects calculations 
Theoretical framework:  Information asymmetry, Agency theory, Theories related to 
Venture Capital, Theories related to the Swedish Venture Capital 
market  
Empirical foundation: A sample of 233 Venture Capital exits during the time period 
2000-2014 
Conclusion: The main findings of this study are that the likelihood of achieving 
a successful exit increases if the investing firm is private and if the 
geographical distance between investing firm and investee is 
limited. Furthermore, it is possible to conclude that the Swedish 
Venture Capital industry share several features with international 
counterparts, although the importance of the IPO for the overall 
funding of the industry is negligible. Instead the Swedish Venture 
Capital industry has been and will likely continue to be driven by 
governmental intervention   
  
4 
 
Table of contents 
 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Problem discussion ........................................................................................................................ 7 
1.3 Purpose .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
1.4 Research question .......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.5 Research contribution .................................................................................................................... 9 
2. Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................... 10 
2.1 Background to Venture Capital ................................................................................................... 10 
2.2 The role of the VC firm ............................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Active assistance .................................................................................................................. 12 
2.2.2 Certification .......................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2.3 Monitoring and control ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 VC exit routes .............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.3.1 Initial public offering ............................................................................................................ 13 
2.3.2 Trade sale & secondary buyout ............................................................................................ 14 
2.3.3 Management buy-back ......................................................................................................... 14 
2.3.4 Write-off ............................................................................................................................... 15 
2.4 The Swedish Venture Capital market .......................................................................................... 15 
2.4.1 Governmental VC firms ....................................................................................................... 16 
2.4.2 Entrepreneurial clusters ........................................................................................................ 17 
2.4.3 Geographical proximity ........................................................................................................ 17 
2.5 Summary of previous relevant studies ........................................................................................ 18 
2.6 Summary of hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 21 
3. Methodological approach ............................................................................................................... 22 
3.1 Data collection ............................................................................................................................. 22 
3.1.1 Selection criteria ................................................................................................................... 23 
3.1.1.1 First cut .......................................................................................................................... 23 
3.1.1.2 Second cut ..................................................................................................................... 23 
3.1.2 Sample .................................................................................................................................. 24 
3.1.3 Time frame ........................................................................................................................... 24 
3.2 Variables ...................................................................................................................................... 25 
3.2.1 Dependent variable ............................................................................................................... 25 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables ........................................................................................................... 26 
3.2.2.1 Private VC ..................................................................................................................... 26 
5 
 
3.2.2.2 Entrepreneurial clusters ................................................................................................. 26 
3.2.2.3 Geographical proximity ................................................................................................. 27 
3.2.3 Control variables .................................................................................................................. 27 
3.2.3.1 Size of assets ................................................................................................................. 28 
3.2.3.2 EF Quality ..................................................................................................................... 28 
3.2.3.3 High growth industry ..................................................................................................... 29 
3.2.3.4 Yearly exit dummies...................................................................................................... 29 
3.2.3.5 Investment duration ....................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 Econometric techniques .............................................................................................................. 30 
3.3.1 Binary logit model ................................................................................................................ 30 
3.3.2 Marginal effects .................................................................................................................... 31 
3.4 Reliability and validity ................................................................................................................ 31 
3.4.1 Model adequacy ................................................................................................................... 32 
3.4.2 Multicollinearity ................................................................................................................... 32 
3.4.3 Exclusions and missing observations ................................................................................... 33 
3.4.4 Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 33 
4. Empirical results .............................................................................................................................. 34 
4.1 Descriptive statistics .................................................................................................................... 34 
4.2 Regression results ........................................................................................................................ 35 
4.3 Marginal effects ........................................................................................................................... 38 
5. Analysis ............................................................................................................................................ 39 
6. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 44 
6.1 Suggestions for future research ................................................................................................... 45 
References ............................................................................................................................................ 46 
Articles: ............................................................................................................................................. 46 
Books: ................................................................................................................................................ 47 
Databases: .......................................................................................................................................... 47 
E-resources: ....................................................................................................................................... 47 
Appendix 1: Sample ............................................................................................................................ 49 
Appendix 2: Governmental VCs ........................................................................................................ 53 
Appendix 3: Model adequacy ............................................................................................................. 54 
Appendix 4: Correlation matrix......................................................................................................... 55 
 
  
6 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will offer an introduction to the topic at hand and the fundamental research 
problem will be discussed. Further, the purpose of the study will be presented along with the 
research question and the research contribution. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Skype, a communication software firm was during 2011 sold to Microsoft for SEK 54 billion 
in a trade sale (DN, 2011). The rumored IPO of Spotify is estimated at around SEK 66 billion
1
 
(Reuters, 2014) implying that it would be one of the largest IPOs ever by a Swedish firm if it 
were to happen (Bloomberg, 2015). QlikTech started its journey in Lund in 1993. 17 years 
later its shares were trading on the New York Nasdaq exchange. Lars Björk CEO, became 
historical as the second swede to list a firm in New York (SvD, 2013). 
 
Since the start of the new millennia, Sweden in general and Stockholm in particular has 
evolved into one of the most prominent technological hot spots in the world. Companies such 
as Skype, Spotify and QlikTech are just a few prominent examples of entrepreneurial firms 
(EF) who share a common denominator. They were all at one point or another backed by 
Venture Capital (VC) investors. The Swedish VC market has since the 1980s evolved into a 
vital institution which combined manages funds of around SEK 100 billion (SVCA, 2014; 
Isaksson, 2006). However, the VC industry is not what it used to be. The “dot com” crash as 
well as the more recent financial crisis has reduced the industry to a fraction of what it was 
some 15 years ago (Söderblom, 2012). 
 
According to an annual review conducted by the Swedish Private Equity & Venture Capital 
Association (SVCA) and tillväxtanalys, the Swedish VC market in 2013 received SEK 2.0 
billion in investments distributed to around 220 EFs, implying that the declining trend 
observed ever since 2008 (SEK 4.8 billion) was broken (SVCA, 2014). The same pattern can 
be observed in Europe where VC investments declined from SEK 58.7 billion
2
 in 2008 to 
                                                          
1
 Translated from USD to SEK using the exchange rate as of 2015-05-13: 1 USD = 8.29 SEK 
2
 Translated from EUR to SEK using the exchange rate as of 2015-05-13: 1 EUR = 9.32 SEK 
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SEK 31.6 billion
2
 in 2013 (EVCA, 2014) and in the US where investments declined from 
SEK 248.6 billion
1
 in 2008 to SEK 79.0 billion
1
 in 2013 (NVCA, 2014).  
 
The cyclicality of the VC industry is strongly correlated with the economy in general 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999) and the availability of well-functioning equity markets that 
facilitate exits through IPOs (Ogden, Jen & O’Connor, 2003). The importance of having a 
viable exit route is further significant due to accountability issues between VC managers and 
their capital providers. Without the opportunity to exit investments, the VC industry would 
cool off as investors would look elsewhere to place their capital (Black & Gilson, 1998; Jeng 
& Wells, 2000). Furthermore, as young firms often lack the ability to pay dividends to its 
investors, capital gain from successful exits become the most important source of income for 
VC firms (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003a). Thus, the exit as a mechanism is perhaps the most 
important factor in the entire venture capital cycle and it has effect on all other parts, from 
fundraising to contracting (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). 
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
 
VC firms have historically shared a common desire, that of taking firms public. The IPO has 
been, and perhaps still is, the strongest driver for the fundraising of the VC industry (Jeng & 
Wells, 2000) and it is often considered to be axiomatically better than other exit routes for all 
EFs and under all circumstances (Povaly, 2006). Such is the case for the US market. 
 
Internationally, evidence from Singapore (Wang & Sim, 2001), and from Canada (Cumming 
& MacIntosh, 2003a&b) suggest that the exit is a strong driver not only in the US but 
internationally as well. However, in Singapore no relation was found between the general 
level of equity valuation of the economy and the likelihood of VC investments being exited 
through IPOs, a relationship considered to be strong in the US. In Canada, the predictive 
power of the authors’ model was weaker than in the US due to economic, legal and 
institutional reasons.  
 
With the US being arguably the country in the world that is the most heavily reliant on the 
equity markets for financing (Nobes & Parker, 2012) and both Singapore and Canada 
following not far behind (both classified as Anglo-Saxon, and thus thought to be similar to the 
US, in terms of legal framework and main source of financing), even small differences 
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between the countries raises some interesting questions regarding the situation in non-Anglo-
Saxon countries such as Sweden where market characteristics are very different and the VC 
industry is much less developed, an argument supported by Black & Gilson (1998) who 
scrutinize  differences between stock-market centered and bank centered economies. 
 
The “IPO-centered” model for understanding VC has worked in the past, and perhaps still 
works on certain markets and under certain assumptions. However, recent literature has shed 
new light on the issue, discussing it from new perspectives in terms of understanding that 
differences in the characteristics of domestic markets will lead to the evolution of slightly 
different VC markets. It is therefore interesting to conduct this study on the Swedish market 
to challenge what we thought we knew and to investigate this issue considering settings that 
previously has been unexplored. 
 
1.3 Purpose 
     
The purpose of this study is to investigate if and how characteristics of the Swedish VC 
industry affect the exit outcome in VC investments. The exits for the purpose of this study 
being IPO, trade sale, secondary buyout, buy-back and write-offs where the four initial exits 
are pooled to one category named return generating exits, thought to proxy for successful 
exits.  
 
We will investigate investments, both conducted and exited between 2000 and 2014, a period 
during which the VC market, both in Sweden and internationally has seen extensive volatility 
and undergone somewhat of a transformation.  
 
There have been a few attempts to explain exit outcomes with national traits (Wang & Sim, 
2003; Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003a&b; Cumming, 2008), but none to our knowledge have 
investigated the Swedish market.  
 
1.4 Research question 
 
To investigate if and how certain characteristics, attributable to the Swedish VC market, relate 
to exit outcomes, the following research question will be central to this study: 
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 What characteristics of the Swedish VC market affect, and how do they do so, the exit 
outcome for VC investments? 
 
1.5 Research contribution 
 
This study contributes to the existing body of research in two ways. First, it explores a market 
that has not seen this kind of research previously. Given the somewhat special features of the 
Swedish market, with governmental VC (GVC) firms and a fairly low dependence on the 
stock market for financing, it is our belief that such research could potentially offer insights, 
not only applicable to the narrow VC literature, but to the entire Swedish financial system and 
its policy makers.  
 
Second, our self-collected dataset offers a comprehensive review of the current state of the 
Swedish VC industry as a whole. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter will provide a foundation consisting of relevant theories and previous empirical 
research conducted on the topic. The chapter aims to enrich the readers’ knowledge and 
perception of Venture Capital and the challenges that are relevant to the industry. Finally, the 
chapter will serve as a starting point in relation to the coming analysis. 
 
The literature on, and in relation to VC is vast. For the purpose of this study we will first 
define and explain VC from a theoretical perspective before turning to the Swedish VC 
market, which exhibits some important differences when comparing it to international 
markets where most of the research on exit determinants has been conducted. The chapter will 
end with a summary of previous relevant studies and a summary of the posed hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Background to Venture Capital 
 
VC is essentially a subset to Private Equity (PE), which in turn is defined as capital infusions 
in privately owned firms that are not loans (Nyman, Lundgren & Rösiö, 2012). PE can then be 
divided into buyout and VC. A VC investment is defined as an investment in a privately 
owned, early stage and high growth firm, whereas a buyout is an investment in a mature firm. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the relationship between PE, VC and buyout. 
 
 Figure 1. Venture Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PRIVATE EQUITY 
VENTURE CAPITAL 
SEED FINANCING 
R&D 
START-UP 
Product development and  
establishment of companies 
EXPANSION 
Growth and expansion  
phase 
BUYOUT 
Acquisition of mature companies 
or buyouts from the public market 
Inspired by figure 1, Riksbanken 2005 
Investment phase Exit 
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Separating VC from buyout is not completely clear cut as there are no strict lines that dictate 
when a firm makes the transition from being early stage to being mature. However, there are 
some distinguishing features of VC that are not usually present in buyouts. Mitchell (2009) 
mentions eight potential differences for example cash flow in the targeted firm, profitability 
of the targeted firm and the source of the funds used to acquire the target. To generalize, one 
could argue that VC firms go for cash poor, unprofitable targets and invest only the funds 
made available by the VCs investors, whereas buyout firms go for firms with excess cash 
flow that have proven a profitable business model and investments are often a mixture 
between internal equity and debt of some kind. 
 
2.2 The role of the VC firm 
 
The fundamental “raison d’être” for the VC industry can be derived from one of the most 
influential ideas within the finance literature, the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 
1984). According to said theory information asymmetry between stakeholders create moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems which in turn increases the investors demand for 
premiums. It has further been shown that young EFs can be associated with extreme levels of 
information asymmetries compared to larger and more mature firms (Casser, 2004). In such a 
situation, VC firms can act as a financial intermediary, enabling a better flow of both 
information and capital between EFs and investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
 
By acting as a financial intermediary, thus mitigating agency problems, the VC can increase 
the likelihood of achieving a successful exit outcome (Cumming & Johan, 2008). Jeng & 
Wells (2002) summarize these costs as being due to adverse selection and moral hazard, the 
cost of administration, information gathering and search efforts.  
 
The role of the financial intermediary mainly focuses on banks (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
However, banks are not optional intermediaries for young firms that lack the financial 
strength to provide sufficient collateral in order to get a loan. And as a consequence, the VC 
industry emerged to bridge the gap and facilitate financing for young, early-stage, firms (Jeng 
& Wells, 2000). 
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2.2.1 Active assistance 
 
The first way that VC firms add value to their investees is through active assistance. A VC 
firm can offer strategic, financial, recruitment and marketing advice as well as introduce the 
EF to instances such as investment banks, legal councilors and suppliers (Blach & Gilson, 
1998; Cumming, 2008; Cumming & Johan 2008; Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003a). The key 
factor is the knowledge and experience that accumulate in VC firms. By sharing said 
knowledge and experience the VC can guide the EF and help them through predictable 
problems that are commonly faced by young firms moving from prototype development to a 
viable business. 
 
2.2.2 Certification 
 
A second way to add value, somewhat related to the first, is through certification. The VC can 
ensure the quality of the EF simply by investing in it, which results in lower information 
asymmetry between the EF and new investors, once the VC decide to exit their investment 
(Black & Gilson, 1998; Cumming, 2008; Cumming & Johan, 2008; Cumming & MacIntosh, 
2003a). VC financing can thus increase the credibility of the EF in terms of relations with 
third parties, such as suppliers and customers, whose contribution and collaboration can be 
crucial to the success of the EF. 
 
The impact of these two initial roles is coherent with the fact that reputable VCs facilitate IPO 
exits more often (Cumming, 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Monitoring and control 
 
VCs also play an important monitoring and control function towards the EF and other parties 
involved. The monitoring can be performed by frequent informal visits to the EF, meetings 
with customers and suppliers and through active involvement in strategic decision making of 
the firm. The demand for control is often disproportionate to the size of the equity investment 
with investors claiming a majority share of the board positions without holding a majority 
share of the equity for instance. The aspect of control is often detailed in the contracts 
between the VC and the EF and almost exclusively involves board representation (Black & 
Gilson, 1998; Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003a; Lerner, 1995). The monitoring and control 
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function implies that VCs can invest in firms without stable cash flows and/or tangible assets 
as security, something that banks require in order to facilitate financing on their behalf 
(Lerner, 1995). Finally, strong control arrangements can act in the same way that loan 
covenants would. By having a majority stake in the board it is possible to replace the 
entrepreneur if performance lags, increasing the accountability for the financial performance 
(Black & Gilson, 1998). 
 
2.3 VC exit routes 
 
Investments have to at some point be terminated in order to generate cash flows and returns to 
the VCs and their investors (Jeng & Wells, 2000). There are five primary routes a VC can exit 
an investment; through an initial public offering (IPO), a trade sale (TS), a secondary buyout 
(SBO), a management buy-back (MBB) or through a write-off (WO). Each type of exit has its 
own execution process and requirements, and poses different advantages as well as 
disadvantages. The common view of literature is that IPOs along with an entry to a stock 
exchange market is the ultimate form of exit for VCs, but Povaly (2006) underlines that each 
case is unique and dependent on the firm’s stage of development, its outlook and potential 
buyers. Povaly (2006) further suggests that this might not be the situation for European VC 
firms given the less liquid capital markets observed in Europe compared to the US. Instead 
European VCs have favored an acquisition exit i.e. exiting though a sale to another firm either 
strategic or financial. Given that Sweden is highly reliant on banks for financing (Nobes & 
Parker, 2012), it is likely fair to assume that IPO will not be the primary exit route for the 
investments included in this study. 
 
2.3.1 Initial public offering 
 
An IPO is a transaction in which a firm sells a portion of its shares to public investors by 
typically entering a stock exchange market. The shares that are sold can be offered by large 
shareholders such as founders, angel investors or VCs but are generally newly issued 
shares.  This because it is important that founders and other early stage investors remain as 
shareholders to signal an optimistic view of the firm. In order to enforce this, it is common 
that large shareholders are restricted from selling shares during a certain time-period during 
and after an IPO, commonly ranging from six months to two years (Cumming & MacIntosh, 
2003a). Generally, exits that include a large number of new owners such as the IPO, are 
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associated with more difficult information asymmetries to overcome, since the dispersed 
owners neither have the tools nor expertise to carry out a due diligence process to ensure the 
quality of the firm (Cumming & Johan 2008). This implies a problem for VCs since studies 
have shown that IPOs are typically the form of exit that can raise the largest amount of money 
and thus also be the most profitable exit route. 
 
2.3.2 Trade sale & secondary buyout 
 
The most common way for VCs to exit an investment in Europe is through a trade sale or a 
secondary buyout. The only factor that separates the two is that a trade sale focuses the 
process towards a strategic buyer, competitor or business partner, while a secondary buyout 
implies selling to another financial investor (EVCA, 2014). The deal is usually structured by 
investment banks that identify and analyze potential acquirers, and given the results of this, a 
number of different process styles can be considered that accomplish different objectives 
(Povaly, 2006). The different processes are characterized by the number of parties involved, 
where a Pre-emptive bid approaches a single logical buyer, a Targeted solicitation involves 2-
8 selected candidates, a Managed auction targeting 8-15 candidates and a Public auction 
where there is an unlimited scope of bidders. Choosing a process with fewer parties involved 
generally implies higher control and makes it possible to manage and execute quicker. By 
having a higher control, you reduce the risk of valuable business information being exploited. 
Povaly (2006) further argues that as the number of potential buyers increase, there is a higher 
probability of business disruption, competitive tension and increased complexity of the 
transaction process.  
 
Finally, acquisition exits, conducted by either a strategic or a financial buyer are associated 
with less information asymmetry problems (compared to an IPO) since the acquiring firm 
generally has the financial strength, expertise and time to carry out a thorough due diligence 
process (Cumming & Johan, 2008). 
 
2.3.3 Management buy-back 
 
A buy-back transaction is when an investor sells back its equity investment to the 
entrepreneur. This occurs when an investor see a limited potential upside in an early stage 
investment, that typically still has a relatively low valuation. The transaction is usually 
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executed through a put option on the equity, which was structured when the initial investment 
was made. There are also cases where entrepreneurs use buy-backs as a form of leveraged 
buyout, but such transactions are rare (EVCA, 2014). The transaction is often swift since 
parties involved are well informed of the firm’s current status, which limits the need of in 
depth due diligence of the firm and other time consuming processes such as negotiations 
about warranties and indemnity provisions (Povaly, 2006). 
 
2.3.4 Write-off 
 
If an EF has not developed as planned and the VC no longer sees a potential upside in the 
firm, they can choose to write-off the investment in their books. However, even though a 
write-off is considered an exit route, it does not necessarily mean that the VC disposes its 
equity part since some of these EFs might have small streams of cash flows. Unfortunately, 
these cash flows are not sufficient to maintain the VCs active involvement (Cumming & 
MacIntosh, 2008). 
 
2.4 The Swedish Venture Capital market  
 
The Swedish VC market was in a sense born in the year 1973 with the creation of the very 
first Swedish VC firm - Företagskapital (Karaömerlioglu & Jacobsson, 2000), at that time 
semi-private. During the 1970s’ the Swedish government started using VC as a tool to get the 
country out of the economic down cline experienced throughout the decade. Thus, the 
Swedish VC industry was essentially created by the Swedish government. During the early 
1980s’ the industry grew, both from the creation of new GVCs but also thanks to the 
establishment of the first private VC (PVC) firms. Furthermore, the Over-The-Counter market 
was created to facilitate the trading of shares in smaller companies, thus increasing their 
access to capital (Isaksson, 2006). Towards the end of the decade the Swedish economy was 
once again facing a financial crisis with falling stock prices and increasing interest rates. This 
led to a collapse of the VC market (Söderblom, 2012). The stagnation lasted into the 1990s, 
but towards the middle of the decade the industry experienced its second boom period. Once 
again, the government played a part in the rebound of the market. With the creation of Atle 
and Bure the government infused SEK 6.5 billion into the VC market, a figure that can be 
compared to SEK 4.7 billion, which was the size of the entire industry in 1987 
(Karaömerlioglu & Jacobsson, 2000). Furthermore, tax reductions were introduced for 
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venture investors and some restrictions for certain pension funds were eased (Baygan, 2003). 
The now booming market climaxed around the year 2000 and by then around 200 firms were 
managing around SEK 120 billion (Isaksson, 2006). The years following the crash in the early 
2000s’ once again reduced the Swedish VC industry by both forcing young VCs into 
bankruptcy as well as shifting the focus of the survivors to investment in later stages 
(Söderblom, 2012). 
 
2.4.1 Governmental VC firms  
 
As mentioned, the Swedish government has used VC as a tool at several occasions and the 
Swedish VC industry has become heavily influenced by that. Many other countries have also 
recognized the economic benefits of having governmental intervention in the VC industry, 
that drive the fundraising during bad times (Jeng & Wells, 2000).  Brander, Egan & Hellmann 
(2008) estimate that 50% of all venture capital invested in Canadian enterprises originates 
from government-sponsored VC funds, and EVCA (2014) state that 35% of total VC funds 
raised in Europe during 2014 originated from government agencies.  
 
However, GVC has endured heavy critique from researchers who claim that they are not as 
effective and profitable as PVC. The critique is built upon the fact that most GVCs are 
restricted by statutory covenants that limit their investment scope, leading to some 
investments not being optimal from a pure VC perspective (Cumming & Johan, 2008). 
Another critique is that GVC investments might “crowd out” PVC investments, meaning that 
researchers are unsure if GVCs increase the size of the market or whether they replace 
investments from, superior from a theoretical perspective, private firms (Brander, Egan & 
Hellmann, 2008).  
 
The purpose of the Swedish GVCs is to act as a complement to the PVC market and thus 
increase the access to capital for firms that cannot receive capital from PVCs (Riksrevisionen, 
2014). The need for this stems from an assumption of a market failure that creates a financing 
gap for young EFs that do not operate in the “right” industry or in the “right” place 
geographically for instance. Swedish GVC thus strives to be beneficial to the society and to 
facilitate a more equal VC market across the country by creating regional and/or industry 
specific VC funds. One feature that clearly distinguishes the Swedish GVCs from its private 
counterparts is the low emphasis on financial returns. It is in fact only Fourtiertransform AB 
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that has a clearly defined goal of generating market-like returns to its owners. In general, 
focus is instead on acting as a complement to the market, contributing to sustained 
development and benefiting regional entrepreneurship. 
 
2.4.2 Entrepreneurial clusters 
 
EFs with similar characteristics tend to pop up close to each other. Silicon Valley (California, 
USA) is probably the most recognized VC and EF cluster, which during the last decades has 
developed success stories such as Intel, Apple and Sun Microsystems. Florida & Kenney 
(1988) explain clusters by arguing that even though VCs are not absolutely necessary in order 
to facilitate high technology EFs, they definitely work as a catalyst by lowering barriers 
associated to the entry of a market. Because of the previous stated argument, clusters with 
VCs attract EFs and technical personal which in turn attracts new VCs. The result of this 
phenomenon can be seen as a self-reinforcing cycle of new enterprise formation, innovation, 
and economic development (Florida & Kenney, 1988). The theory is consistent with Lerner 
(1996) finding that the success of high growth firms active in the GVC program SBIR (Small 
Business Innovation Program) was limited to ZIP codes with substantial VC activity and new 
firm creation.  
 
As mentioned in the very first section of this thesis, VC investments in Sweden are highly 
regionally concentrated. The Stockholm region has become a world-leading technology hub 
fostering many now global Information and Communication Technology (ICT) firms 
(Baygan, 2003). Gothenburg has experienced a similar situation with the creation of 
Lindholmen Science Park, located close to the city center and close to Chalmers University of 
Technology (Bergsjö & Björk, 2013). Finally, the university towns of Lund and Uppsala 
serves as important clusters where the University holding companies act together with private 
actors to facilitate a vivid entrepreneurial environment especially within Life Science 
(Baygan, 2003; Sölvell, 2015). 
 
2.4.3 Geographical proximity 
 
VCs engagement as monitors and their ability to actively participate in decision making is 
associated with substantial transaction costs. If these transaction costs are successfully 
limited, the VCs involvement in their investment will naturally increase. Lerner (1995) 
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investigates the relation between VCs and EFs by their geographical proximity and finds that 
it is an important determinant of VC board membership. More specifically, the study finds 
that VCs with offices within 5 miles of the EFs headquarter is twice as likely to being an 
active partner and have seats on the board compared to VC firms that are distanced by 500 
miles or more. 
 
With the Swedish VC industry historically being highly regionally concentrated along with 
GVCs poised to increase the geographical diversity of entrepreneurship it is fair to assume 
that investment have been made, and most likely will continue to be made, where the VC and 
the EF are situated geographically far apart. With the growing reputation of the universities of 
Linköping and Umeå for instance, entrepreneurship has sparked in these communities but the 
VC industry has yet to adapt, with most VC firms still operating in the major cities (Baygan, 
2003). Investments in companies emerging in new places are thus interesting as it is 
questionable if the investing VC is able to fulfil its value-add commitment as discussed in 
section 2.2 The role of the VC firm. 
 
2.5 Summary of previous relevant studies 
 
“Information Asymmetries, Agency Costs and Venture Capital Exit Outcomes” 
Cumming and Johan (2008) investigate venture capital exits and the relation to how 
information asymmetry and agency costs affect the exit outcome. The authors state that if 
VCs are able to successfully mitigate information asymmetry faced by the new owners and 
are able to mitigate agency costs connected to the transaction, a more successful exit will be 
achieved. The study is based on a dataset consisting of all VC-backed IPOs, acquisitions, 
secondary sales, buy-backs and write-offs in Canada between the years 1991 to 2004. 
In order to study the effects of information asymmetry and agency costs, the authors present 
three main hypothesis, (1) IPOs and acquisitions which are considered successful exits will to 
a greater extent be associated with limited partnership VCs (2) corporate VCs will to a greater 
extent be associated with acquisitions, and (3) government VCs will be associated with 
inferior exit routes such as secondary sales, buy-backs and write-offs. The study also tests if 
common equity investments, to a higher degree are associated with IPOs given the argument 
that control should be retained within the EF, along with a mix of other firm characteristic 
hypothesis that is affected by information asymmetry and agency costs.  
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The authors find that VCs in Canada has had less successful exit outcomes compared to VCs 
in Australasia, Europe and the US. The authors state that this is a result of the structure of the 
VC industry in Canada, where 50% of capital under management derives from LSVCCs 
(labor-sponsored venture capital corporations). They explain this by arguing that LSVCCs are 
characterized by inefficient statutory contractual corporate governance covenants that forces 
investments to be made in companies that are not ideal from a VC perspective. Another 
finding is that acquisitions are more likely for corporate VCs, Life Science and other high-
tech firms, which is in line with prior conducted research.  
“Venture-Capital Exits in Canada and the United States” 
Cumming & MacIntosh (2003a) conduct a study on VC exit determinants in Canada and the 
United States between 1992 and 1995. The study is the first theoretical and empirical analysis 
on the full spectra of different exit routes. The authors rank the different alternatives and 
argue that performing an IPOs is the most profitable exit route, followed by acquisitions, 
secondary sales, buy-backs and lastly write-offs which is considered the least profitable 
alternative. The authors state that VCs will try to achieve the highest possible price upon 
exiting their investment in order to maximize their earnings, and consider mitigating 
information asymmetry between parties involved in a transaction to be vital in order to 
achieve the highest possible value.  
The study focuses on different EF characteristics and their correlation with different exit 
outcomes, and presents three hypotheses; (1) higher quality EFs (defined by a higher market-
to-book ratio) will be exited by (in decreasing order of likelihood) IPOs, acquisitions, 
secondary sales, buy-backs and write-offs, (2) a longer duration of a VC investment increases 
the probability (in decreasing order of likelihood) IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buy-
backs and write-offs, and (3) high-technology EFs will (in decreasing order of likelihood) be 
exited by IPOs and acquisitions, then secondary sales, buy-backs and write-offs.  
The authors test the hypothesized relationships using a multinomial logit methodology and 
find mixed evidence for hypothesis 1, no evidence for hypothesis 2 and weak evidence for 
hypothesis 3. The result from hypothesis 1 was the most interesting and supports the author’s 
theory that higher quality firms in terms of market to book ratio increases the probability of an 
IPO, and as the ratio increases the overall probability of a successful exit route increases. 
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However, ranking the other different exit alternatives was not possible except for write-offs, 
which was highly correlated with a low market to book ratio.  
“Exit strategies of venture capital-backed companies in Singapore” 
Wang & Sim analyze the VC industry in Singapore and determinants that affect VC exit 
routes. The study relies on VC exit data collected from 1990 to 1998 and is unique since 
earlier studies never have focused on an emerging market. The VC industry in Singapore is 
still in an early stage compared to countries in the west, but compared to similar developing 
countries they have come a long way. 
In order to analyze the VC market and when a successful exit is achieved, the authors decide 
to focus on IPOs, not because it necessarily is the optimal form of exit but because it requires 
considerations from both the VC and the investees. The authors present seven hypotheses; (1) 
the level of equity valuation is positively related with the likelihood that the venture 
capitalists will exit via an IPO, (2) high technology investee companies will experience higher 
probability of IPO-exits than their non-high technology counterparts, (3) the investee firm’s 
potential is positively related with the likelihood that the venture capitalists will exit via an 
IPO, (4) Family-owned investee companies will experience higher probability of IPO-exits 
than their non-family- owned counterparts, (5) younger venture capitalists will perform a 
higher number of IPO-exits than their older counterparts, (6) The frequency of venture 
financing is positively related with the likelihood that the venture capitalists will exit via an 
IPO, and, (7) the total amount of venture financing is positively related with the likelihood 
that the venture capitalists will exit via an IPO.  
The authors find that equity valuation is independent of the likelihood that the venture 
capitalist will exit via an IPO which they explain by the immature market timing in 
Singapore. The results also reveal that high technology firms and firms with high growth 
potential tend to exit via an IPO and the authors explain this by reasoning that an IPO 
facilitates large future capital infusions which often is needed in such firms. Another finding 
is that the potential of the firm in terms of sales is positively related with the likelihood of an 
IPO, but they found no significant correlation between a firms ROE and by performing an 
IPO. The hypothesis that family owned companies to a larger extent performs IPOs could not 
be rejected but there were no significant results that could prove that young VC firms perform 
more IPOs than their older counterparts. Finally, the authors found no connection between the 
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frequency of financing rounds and IPOs, but found the amount of venture financing to be 
positively correlated with IPOs.  
 
2.6 Summary of hypotheses 
 
This segment provides a summary of the hypotheses formulated in regard to the existing body 
of literature and the explanatory variables tested in this study.  
 
H1: Ceritis paribus, investment by PVC firms will experience higher likelihood of achieving a 
successful exit 
 
H2: Ceritis paribus, investments where the VC and the EF are located close to each will 
experience higher likelihood of achieving a successful exit 
 
H3: Ceritis paribus, investments where the EF is located in entrepreneurial clusters will 
experience higher likelihood of achieving a successful exit 
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3. Methodological approach 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach used in this study. The purpose is to 
clarify how the data was collected, which variables will be used in our regression analysis 
and describe the econometric techniques used. The chapter will end with a critical discussion 
on the methodological approach. 
 
Given the purpose of this study, a quantitative approach is preferred over a qualitative. 
Previous research conducted within the same field and with a similar purpose have strongly 
favored a quantitative approach (Cumming, 2008; Wang & Sim, 2001; Cumming & Johan, 
2008), where data is collected either through questionnaires or through the use of databases. 
Such an approach have several benefits, perhaps the most prominent being the possibility to 
run statistical analysis on the data in order to quantify relationships between variables 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
 
We will conduct a binary logistic regression supplemented with marginal effects calculations. 
This should provide insight both as to how the variables relate, and of what magnitude the 
relationship is. 
 
This study will also follow what is known as a deductive research approach (Bryman & Bell, 
2003) where hypotheses are formulated based on, and in coherence with existing theory. 
Thus, the data collection and the results of the study will be driven by existing theory which is 
then revised based on if the hypotheses were accepted or rejected. For the deductive approach 
to be effective one must therefore be well oriented in the entire existing body of literature in 
order not to make false inference. 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
There have been two main ways of obtaining data observed in previous research on this topic. 
First, through the use of questionnaires sent to VC fund managers asking for information 
regarding previous exits. Second, data has been self-collected through a database containing 
information on VC investments. This study will use the second approach and more 
specifically the database Zephyr. Zephyr is a well-known database commonly used by 
23 
 
scholars, which adds credibility and reliability to our sample. The use of a database also 
increases the replicability of the study. 
 
For the variables used in this study we will mainly rely on Retriever Bolagsinfo (Retriever), a 
comprehensive database of annual reports from Swedish firms both listed and un-listed, to 
find financial data for the EFs. Further, we will complement that with internal information 
from firm websites and press releases if necessary. Retriever is the most prominent source of 
financial reports for unlisted firms in Sweden and we consider it to be the most 
comprehensive source of financial data for such firms. All data points used are those of the 
most recent available annual report at the time of the event. 
 
3.1.1 Selection criteria 
 
The two subsections below describe how the final sample was obtained. The reason for the 
two-stage approach is simply that we found that it was not possible to obtain the sample 
through a single search in Zephyr. Further, we found that investing firms are somewhat 
reluctant to disclose information on especially write-offs, which implied that we had to 
manually search for such exits in annual reports and third party press releases. 
 
3.1.1.1 First cut 
 
The list below shows the criteria used to obtain the first cut of our sample through Zephyr. 
 
1. The transaction is labeled as “Venture Capital” in Zephyr 
2. The investment was done between 2000-01-01 and 2014-12-31 
3. The target firm is based in Sweden 
4. The investing firm is based in Sweden 
 
This search returned a list of 531 deals involving 1288 investments. 
 
3.1.1.2 Second cut 
 
The list below shows the criteria used to reduce the list of transactions obtained from the first 
cut to our final sample. Beside the information provided by the EFs and the VCs in their 
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annual reports and public statements we relied on Zephyr for information on exits covered by 
the scope of the database as well as websites such as crunchbase.com and agentum.no, both 
prominent and reliable sources of VC information, to find information regarding exits. 
 
1. The investment was exited between 2000-01-01 and 2014-12-31 
2. When several investment rounds to the same EF was found in the sample, the earliest 
one was used, excluding add-on investments done by the same VC firm 
3. Only investments done by Swedish firms with “investment activities” listed as an area 
of operations were included 
 
This returned our final sample of 233 exited investments in 150 different Swedish EFs done 
by 83 different VC firms. 
 
3.1.2 Sample 
 
In accordance with what is reported in SVCA (2014), our sample indicates that ICT and Life 
Science are the dominating industries in terms of attracting VC investments. However, in 
recent years Cleantech firms have also been attracting the investors’ interest. In terms of 
geography our sample also indicates that the majority of the VC investments go to EFs in and 
around the three major cities together with the university-cities Lund and Uppsala. 
 
Comparing the sample used in this study to that of SVCA (2014) thus leads us to believe that 
the sample at hand reflects the Swedish VC industry in a thorough and highly reliable way. 
Any small discrepancies between our sample and what is suggested by SVCA can likely be 
explained by the fact that the definition of what constitutes a VC investment versus a Buyout 
is vague at best (Appendix 1 displays all the investments that are included in the sample).  
 
3.1.3 Time frame 
 
The time frame spans from 2000 until 2014. It is our belief that this period is highly 
interesting because of the fact that the VC industry has gone through significant 
metamorphosis since the year 2000, as discussed earlier in this thesis. Further, the economic 
climate since the start of the new millennium has been highly volatile with events such as the 
“dot com” bubble in the early 2000s’, the financial crisis starting in 2008 and the recent 
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sovereign debt crisis taking place in several Eurozone countries during the last few years, all 
driving the evolution, or perhaps the involution, of the international economy. 
 
Additionally, finding financial data on the EFs rely on the availability of such information in 
Retriever and it is common that 2000 is the first year available thus making it a suitable time 
frame in terms of data access as well. 
 
3.2 Variables 
 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
As this study investigates the factors that drive successful, return generating exits in Sweden, 
the dependent variable is exit type. This binary variable will be 1 if the exit was one of the 
return generating ones and 0 if it was write-off.  
 
Because of the heavy bias towards trade sales and write-offs, together comprising 86% of the 
included exits (see section 4.1 Descriptive statistics for a thorough description of the sample), 
the multinomial approach used by some previous research becomes ineffective in terms of 
providing statistically significant and reliable results. Therefore, we merged the four return 
generating exits (IPO, TS, SBO and MBB) into one category that we call “return generating 
exits”. This category will be compared to the existing category write-off. This approach will 
be similar to that of Cumming (2008), Cumming & Johan (2008) Wang & Sim (2001) who all 
focus on analyzing determinants of successful exits, but where the definition of what a 
successful exit is differs from study to study. 
 
Table 1 (see section 4.1 Descriptive statistics) illustrates in what ways the return generating 
exits are similar and where they might be slightly different. Overall it is clear that the four 
return generating exits share characteristics that set them apart from the investments exited 
through write-off and we therefore feel confident that this approach will be reliable and reflect 
the situation of the Swedish VC industry. For a comprehensive discussion on each of the five 
possible exits see 2.3 VC exit routes.  
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3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
 
In this study the explanatory variables will be related to different characteristics that are 
unique in some respect to Sweden and the Swedish VC industry. To the authors knowledge 
there has been no previous attempt to explain exit type with these variables on the Swedish 
market. 
 
3.2.2.1 Private VC 
 
Separating between PVC and GVC firms is done through the adaptation of a characterization 
done by Riskrevisionen (2014). The difficulty lies in classifying firms that might be partly 
owned by the government through one of its four fully owned VC firms being Almi 
Företagspartner AB, Inlandsinnovation AB, Fourtiertransform AB and Industrifonden. To that 
list, one could also add the sixth AP-fund which also can be considered as a VC-investor. For 
simplicity and replicability we classified all VC firms classified as governmental by 
Riskrevisionen (2014) as GVCs (see Appendix 2 for the complete list of GVCs) and all others 
as PVCs, thus disregarding the possibility of including a third category of hybrid funds 
discussed for instance in Cumming & MacIntosh (2003a). The fundamental difference 
between the private players and the governmental ones is the focus on profit. Public VC firms 
are heavily profit-driven whereas their governmental counterparts might have different 
objectives such as facilitating growth in local communities and in industries that do not attract 
capital from other players. 
 
The variable is constructed as a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the investing firm 
is privately owned and 0 otherwise. The approach is similar to that of (Brander, Egan & 
Hellmann, 2008). 
 
3.2.2.2 Entrepreneurial clusters 
 
The emergence of entrepreneurial clusters has been in tandem with the emergence of the VC 
industry and it can facilitate both deal flow and monitoring. A local VC industry might not be 
necessary to facilitate high technology entrepreneurship, but it creates tremendous incentives 
for start-up firms.  
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The Swedish market for start-up firms is heavily clustered, especially the Stockholm region as 
shown in a report by the OECD (Baygan, 2003). Stockholm-Kista emerged in the beginning 
of the 2000s’ as a global leader in technological innovation and the university-cities of Lund 
and Uppsala are both prominent in Life Science. 
 
The variable is constructed as a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if EF is situated in 
Stockholm, Uppsala, Göteborg, Malmö or Lund and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2.2.3 Geographical proximity 
 
This variable builds on the fundamental theory on VC namely the benefits of governance and 
experience. These aspects are theoretically transferred from the VC to the EF as 
supplementary benefits besides the infusion of the capital itself. This in turn is thought to 
increase the probability of achieving successful exits through enhanced due diligence 
(decreased adverse selection costs) and increased value-added activities (decreased moral 
hazard costs).  
 
For the purpose of this study, the variable is constructed as a dummy variable that take the 
value of 1 if the VC and the EF are situated within 100 km (thought to represent driving 
distance) of each other and 0 otherwise. It is the authors’ belief that this will capture the same 
effects as mentioned above if such effects are present on the Swedish market. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
 
The control variables used in this study comprise of variables that previously have been used 
to explain exit outcomes (Cumming, 2008; Cumming & Johan, 2008; Cumming & 
MacIntosh, 2003a; Wang & Sim, 2001). They can be broken down into three groups. 1) Firm-
specific variables such as the natural logarithm of assets, EBIT margin and return on equity, 
2) industry/market variables such as an industry dummy and two yearly dummies to capture 
the effects of the crises of 2002 and 2008 and 3) investment specific variables which in this 
study only is represented by the investment duration. 
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3.2.3.1 Size of assets 
 
The size of the EF firm’s assets is commonly used to explain exit outcomes. Cumming (2008) 
and Cumming & Johan (2008) suggest that minimum listing requirements for instance imply 
that larger EFs will experience greater likelihood of exit through IPO. Furthermore, as assets 
increase it becomes easier for the new owner to correctly value the business and to monitor 
the firm, thus lowering the cost of potential information asymmetries between the VC and the 
new owner. Smaller firms will therefore be more prone to information asymmetry, which 
lowers the probability of achieving a successful exit.  
 
The variable will be measured as the natural logarithm of the EFs assets at the time of the exit. 
We choose to use logarithm since the variable otherwise would have been too volatile in 
terms of the difference between the largest firm and the smallest firm. 
 
Size = Natural logarithm of assets at exit 
 
3.2.3.2 EF Quality 
 
The quality of the EF is another factor that is commonly used to explain exit outcomes 
(Cumming, 2008; Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003a; Wang & Sim, 2001). As quality is a 
somewhat loose and undefined concept there have been several different approaches to proxy 
for it. 
 
We will use two proxies for EF quality, EBIT margin and return on equity (ROE). Our 
approach is inspired mainly by Wang & Sim (2001) who use sales and ROE to proxy for 
quality or potential as they define it. Given that many of the EFs present in our sample are 
early-stage, and thus lack any sales at all, we instead use EBIT margin and ROE.  
 
EBIT margin is measured as EBIT divided by sales at the time of the exit. In most cases this 
number turned out negative since EBIT usually was negative. This however does not affect 
the statistical efficiency of the variable. 
 
EBIT_MARGIN = EBIT % at exit 
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Return on equity is measured as net income divided by total equity at the time of the exit. As 
with EBIT margin this variable was negative in many cases.  
 
ROE = Net income / Total equity at exit 
 
3.2.3.3 High growth industry 
 
The primary industry of operations is also an important exit determinant. Cumming (2008); 
Cumming & Johan (2008); Cumming & MacIntosh (2003a); Wang & Sim (2001), all test the 
effect of industry of operations. Operating in a high-growth industry is thought to spark the 
interest of investors thus increasing the likelihood of achieving a successful exit. For the 
purpose of this study, high-growth industries are assumed to be ICT, Cleantech (CT) and Life 
Science (LS) and the variable is constructed as a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the EF 
is operating in one of the mentioned industries. 
 
HIGHGWT = 1 if ICT, CT or LS and 0 otherwise 
 
3.2.3.4 Yearly exit dummies 
 
To capture the effect of the “dot-com” bubble and the more recent financial crisis, two 
dummy variables are included. The first taking the value of 1 if the exit was done in 2002 and 
the second taking the value of 1 if the exit was done in 2008. This approach was for instance 
used by Cumming (2008) and Cumming & Johan (2008). 
 
2002EXIT = 1 if exit was done in 2002 and 0 otherwise 
 
2008EXIT = 1 if exit was done in 2008 and 0 otherwise 
 
3.2.3.5 Investment duration 
 
Finally, investment duration is also thought to impact the exit outcome. Cumming & 
MacIntosh (2003a) hypothesize that the longer the investment duration the greater the 
likelihood for a successful exit. However, Cumming & Johan (2008) note that short 
investment durations could imply that initial contracts between the VC and the EF could be 
endogenous to the exit outcome.  
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Looking at Table 1 (section 4.1 Descriptive statistics) one might suspect that investments 
exited as buy-backs could be affected by initial contracts given its significantly shorter 
average duration compared to the other exit routes. However, since the share of buy-backs is 
low, any potential issue should be negligible. 
 
Being aware of the issue above, the variable is still included and measured as investment year 
minus exit year.  
 
Duration = Investment year – exit year 
 
3.3 Econometric techniques 
 
When studying factors behind decision making it is common to use binary choice or 
qualitative response models, the most basic such model being the linear probability model 
(Brooks, 2014). The binary choice framework builds on the fact that dependent variables can 
be discrete, which in the most simple case means being binary or simply put taking the value 
of either 0 or 1.  
 
3.3.1 Binary logit model 
 
The linear probability model has one major limitation; it can produce probabilities less than 0 
and greater than 1, which of course is theoretically impossible. To overcome this issue we 
turn to the logit model which builds on the logistic function, shown below, that transforms the 
regression model so that its fitted values are bound within 0 and 1 (Brooks, 2014). 
 
𝐹(𝑧𝑖) =
𝑒𝑧𝑖
1 + 𝑒𝑧𝑖
=
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑧𝑖
 
 
The control variables will be added one at a time until we end up with the estimated logit 
model in this study is as shown below, where 𝑃𝑖 is the probability that 𝑦𝑖 = 1.  
 
𝑃𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒
−(𝛼 + 𝛽1∗𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2∗100𝐾𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3∗𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4∗𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽5∗2002𝐸𝑋𝐼𝑇𝑖
+ 𝛽6∗2008𝐸𝑋𝐼𝑇𝑖+ 𝛽7∗𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖+ 𝛽8∗𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽9∗𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖)
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Since the model is not linear it cannot be estimated with OLS. Instead maximum likelihood is 
used which also implies that the coefficient values returned from the regression analysis 
cannot be thought of as magnitude of the relationship. To get to that one must manually 
calculate the marginal effects since EViews (the software package used for the statistical tests 
in this study) does not have a built in function for this. 
 
3.3.2 Marginal effects 
 
In order to analyze the magnitude of the relationships obtained from the above stated 
regression one must calculate what is known as the marginal effects. The reason for this is as 
mentioned above the logistic function. Unlike when dealing with linear regression one cannot 
interpreted a 1-unit increase in for example 𝑥2𝑖 to cause a 𝛽2% increase in the probability of 
𝑦𝑖 = 1. Instead a 1-unit increase in 𝑥2𝑖 will in logistic regression imply a 𝛽2𝐹(𝑥2𝑖)(1 −
𝐹(𝑥2𝑖) increase in probability. 
In order to calculate 𝐹(𝑧𝑖) we set the explanatory variables to their mean values and use the 
coefficient estimates obtained by the binary logistic regression. Finally each coefficient is 
multiplied with 𝐹(𝑧𝑖) and 1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑖) to obtain the marginal effects of each single variable.  
 
3.4 Reliability and validity 
 
Reliability is crucial to any given study. It essentially means that the results are replicable 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). There are two potential sources of reliability problems for this study. 
First, relying on secondary data could cause a problem since we cannot ensure the quality of 
the data. However, given the prominence of Zephyr and Retriever, both well considered and 
trustworthy, we believe that any reliability problem would be limited in regard to these 
databases. The second source of potential problems is the high reliance on manual 
investigation. However, all the information included in this study is publicly available which 
implies that anyone trying to replicate this study should come up with the same sample 
although the task of doing so would be tedious.  
 
Validity is also an important concept for studies such as this one. In short, it means that 
something is adequate and legitimate (Bryman & Bell, 2003). For the purpose of this study 
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this can be interpreted as the right variables being used, measuring what should be measured 
given the existing body of literature. Since the variables included in this study are in 
accordance with said body of literature the validity of this study should be considered to be 
high. 
 
The econometric approach of this study resembles what previously has been done on the 
subject, which means that the model itself is reliable and valid. Appropriate robustness tests 
have also been conducted and they are described in the following sections. Finally, we have 
used robust covariances when running regressions, an option which ensures that standard 
error estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity (Brooks, 2014). 
 
3.4.1 Model adequacy 
 
To ensure that the model is correctly specified, a goodness-of-fit test and an expectation-
prediction evaluation were conducted. The detailed results of these tests are found in 
Appendix 3.  
 
The Hoshmer-Lemeshow test for goodness of fit returned a HL-statistic of 6.7086 with a 
corresponding p-value of 0.5684 implying that we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of the 
model not fitting the data. Thus we conclude that the specified model fits the data in an 
acceptable way. 
 
The expectation-prediction evaluation gave similar indications. The specified model was able 
to correctly estimate 87.9% of the observations in the sample which is considered to be a high 
number. 
 
3.4.2 Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity occurs when the explanatory variables are highly correlated with each other. 
This could potentially create problematic regressions to analyze as they would be highly 
biased (Brooks, 2014).  
 
To ensure that multicollinearity was not an issue a correlation matrix was created where the 
explanatory variables were included (Appendix 4). The common cut-off point is 0.8 and 
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considering that the highest correlation found between variables in this study was 0.42, we 
conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
 
3.4.3 Exclusions and missing observations 
 
In obtaining our sample there were some investments where important information was 
missing. To ensure against false inference these deals were therefore excluded from the 
sample. As an example we excluded investments that were conducted by Atle and Bure and 
that were still active at the point of these VCs bankruptcy/restructuring. Even though the 
investments were handed over to a new VC and later exited we decided to exclude them on 
the basis of them not being exited by the original VC, and the change of VC because of the 
bankruptcy/restructuring cannot be considered to be a secondary buyout. A second more 
straight forward example is the case of a few firms that simply could not be found. They were 
mainly receiving investments in the early 2000s’ and after that there is no record of their 
existence in Retriever or the investing VC’s annual reports or website.  
 
A second issue is that of missing observations in the firm specific control variables, especially 
for the investments exited through a write-off. It was not uncommon that a firm being facing 
bankruptcy, and thus a write-off exit, stopped reporting a few years before the exit was final 
which implies that there is no data for the year prior to the actual event.  
 
3.4.4 Limitations 
 
The main limitation of this study in the unbalanced nature of the exits at hand. Had the sample 
been more evenly distributed it would have been possible to conduct multinomial logistic 
regression which potentially could have shed more light on the issue of exit determinants. A 
second limitation is the lack of a unison source of information. Ideally all investments and 
exits would have been available in the same database, something that would have increased 
the reliability of the study.   
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4. Empirical results 
 
In the following chapter the results from the regression analysis and the marginal effect 
calculations are presented. Descriptive statistics of the sample used in the study will begin the 
chapter, after which the regression results will be presented. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the final sample used in the study. The top half displays the 
situation in numerical terms and the bottom part in percentage. As mentioned previously the 
bias towards trade sales and write-offs become apparent. Together the two aforementioned 
exit routes comprise of 86% of the sampled exits. Also worth noting is that the three 
explanatory variables tested in this study all have very high frequency, 77% of the exited 
investments were backed by PVCs, 84% of the exited investments were investments in EFs 
situated in entrepreneurial clusters and 70% of the exited investments were between VCs and 
EFs that were situated close to each other. 
 
Table 1. Sample breakdown 
 
OBSERVATIONS PRIVATEVC CLUSTER PROXIMITY HIGHGWT 2002EXIT 2008EXIT DURATION SIZE EBITMARGIN ROE
IPO 4 3 4 3 4 0 0 6,75 18,65 -725% -22%
TS 117 95 99 80 87 1 16 5,05 17,04 -1092% -273%
SBO 19 15 18 14 13 0 2 5,95 17,00 -1190% -89%
MBB 10 8 7 8 3 3 2 2,30 16,31 -2681% -226%
WO 83 59 68 59 57 13 6 4,17 16,04 -3811% -202%
233 180 196 164 164 17 26 4,72 16,86 -1638% -233%
RGE 150 121 128 105 107 4 20 5,03 17,03 -1238% -239%
WO 83 59 68 59 57 13 6 4,17 16,04 -3811% -202%
233 180 196 164 164 17 26 4,72 16,86 -1638% -233%
OBSERVATIONS PRIVATEVC CLUSTER PROXIMITY HIGHGWT 2002EXIT 2008EXIT
IPO 2% 75% 100% 75% 100% 0% 0%
TS 50% 81% 85% 68% 74% 1% 14%
SBO 8% 79% 95% 74% 68% 0% 11%
MBB 4% 80% 70% 80% 30% 30% 20%
WO 36% 71% 82% 71% 69% 16% 7%
100% 77% 84% 70% 70% 7% 11%
RGE 64% 81% 85% 70% 71% 3% 13%
WO 36% 71% 82% 71% 69% 16% 7%
100% 77% 84% 70% 70% 7% 11%
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Furthermore, comparing the four individual return generating exits to the compiled category, 
it is clear that trade sales dominate the impact on RGE given its large share in the sample. It 
also becomes clear that the compiled category, in relation to write-offs, in fact reflects the 
expected discrepancy between what can be thought of as successful versus unsuccessful exits. 
 
Chart 1 show how the sample is distributed over time. Worth noting is the large spike in 
investments in the beginning of the sample, coherent with the situation of the VC industry 
before the “dot-com” bubble burst. Exits on the other hand are fairly stable during the sample 
except for the first two years which of course can be explained by considering the average 
investment duration of 4.72 years (Table 1). The same logic can be applied to explain the fact 
that there are only a few exited investments where the investment took place during the two 
last years of the sample. 
 
Chart 1. Investment and exits during time frame 
 
 
4.2 Regression results 
 
The table below illustrates the regressions leading up to the final model analyzed in this study. 
The very first regression (1) comprising only of the explanatory variables did not show any 
signs of significance. None of the variables were statistically significant (below 10%) and the 
McFadden R-squared of only 0.94% implies a bad fit. Adding the industry dummy variable 
did not change the situation in any significant way.  
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Table 2. Regression output 
Equation: 
 
Dep. Var: 
 
Expected 
relationship 
 
1 
 
EXIT 
2 
 
EXIT 
3 
 
EXIT 
4 
 
EXIT 
5 
 
EXIT 
6 
 
EXIT 
7 
 
EXIT 
8 
 
EXIT 
          
C 
 
 0.122396  0.074771  0.000756 -0.039659 -0.258881 -10.328074 -16.526406 -17.771831 
  (0.7648) (0.8690) (0.9987) (0.9315) (0.6117) (0.0011)*** (0.0181)** (0.0030)*** 
          
PRIVATEVC +  0.496154  0.487055  0.710193  0.678571  0.634171  1.411320  2.216347  1.835512 
  (0.1362) (0.1462) (0.0395)** (0.0512)* (0.0740)* (0.0117)** (0.0008)*** (0.0110)** 
          
CLUSTER +  0.149259  0.150081  0.257711  0.337592  0.351851  0.481228  0.317282  0.649778 
  (0.7178) (0.7079) (0.5250) (0.4174) (0.4028) (0.3956) (0.6813) (0.4079) 
          
PROXIMITY + -0.046930 -0.051158  0.038483 -0.021294 -0.026468  0.904012  1.751224  1.544269 
  (0.8876) (0.8734) (0.9082) (0.9499) (0.9378) (0.0933)* (0.0121)** (0.0322)** 
          
HIGHGWT +   0.081122 -0.034264 -0.062706 -0.086755 -0.319556  0.194704  0.370591 
   (0.7868) (0.9146) (0.8438) (0.7868) (0.5677) (0.7868) (0.5903) 
          
_2002EXIT -   -2.158993 -2.100997 -1.928900 -2.066506 -2.540434 -3.062242 
    (0.0003)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0639)* (0.0504)* (0.0387)** 
          
_2008EXIT -     0.545749  0.526262  0.012337 -0.700575 -0.711885 
     (0.2742) (0.3032) (0.9847) (0.3790) (0.4588) 
          
DURATION +      0.054016 -0.130609 -0.242232 -0.169071 
      (0.2970) (0.0977)* (0.0189)** (0.1570) 
          
SIZE +       0.658651  1.024931  1.076561 
       (0.0002)*** (0.0125)** (0.0028)*** 
          
EBITMARGIN +        0.009641  0.009414 
        (0.0859)* (0.0579)* 
          
ROE +        -0.036599 
         (0.4617) 
          
Observations:  233 233 233 233 233 157 135 124 
 
R-squared: 
 
0.0094 0.0097 0.0609 0.0649 0.0680 0.1546 0.2678 0.2889 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
          
          
 
 
The third regression (3) gave the model a slightly better fit with a McFadden R-squared of 
6.09%. Furthermore the dummy variable 2002EXIT aimed to capture the effect of the bursting 
“dot-com” bubble proved to be significant with a negative relationship, which it remained 
across all specifications. In the third regression PRIVATEVC became significant with a 
positive relationship, which it too remained for the remainder of the specifications.  
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The fourth (4) and fifth (5) regressions did not improve the model in any crucial way. 
McFadden R-squared increased slightly but none of the previously insignificant coefficients 
became significant.  
 
In the sixth (6) regression, the first variable supposed to proxy for EF quality was added. This 
had a few implications. First, it increased the McFadden R-squared to 15.46% which is a large 
leap from the previous level. Second, PROXIMITY and DURATION became significant with 
positive and negative relationships respectfully, and SIZE itself was significant with a positive 
relationship. Finally, it reduced the testable sample from 233 to 157 because of the fact that 
the variable was missing data (see section 3.4.3 Exclusions and missing observations for 
details). 
 
Adding EBITMARGIN in the seventh (7) regression further strengthened the model and 
increased the McFadden R-squared to 26.78% which for the first time implies a good fit 
objectively speaking. It too reduced the sample size slightly and although the addition of 
EBITMARGIN did not make any new variables significant (apart from being so itself with a 
positive relationship), it changed the sign of both HIGHGWT and 2008EXIT to the expected 
one, implying that all variables except DURATION was suggesting the expected relationship. 
 
The final regression (8) added ROE which raised the McFadden R-squared to 28.89%. The 
variable itself was not significant and in the final regression the previously significant variable 
DURATION became insignificant. ROE was not significant and showed an unexpected 
negative relationship with EXIT.  
 
The regression analysis indicates that both PRIVATEVC and PROXIMITY have positive, 
significant at the 5%-level, relationships with exit route. This implies that investments done 
by PVCs are associated with  greater likelihood of generating a return at exit compared to 
GVCs, and that investments where VC and EF are situated close to each other are associated 
with  greater likelihood of generating a return at exit compared to VCs and EFs being far 
apart.  
 
However, the large impact of the three final control variables suggests that the quality of the 
EF is the dominating factor in terms of achieving return generating exits. It is also evident that 
the bursting “dot-com” bubble in 2002 had a large impact on the entire VC industry that year. 
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4.3 Marginal effects 
 
The marginal effects were calculated as described in section 3.3.2 Marginal effects and 
indicate the magnitude of the relationship found in section 4.2 Regression results. The 
calculations suggest that investments by PVCs are 12.7% more likely to be exited as a return 
generating exit compared to investments by GVCs, this relationship is expected and 
significant to the 5%-level. 
 
Table 3. Marginal effects 
 𝛽𝑖 ?̅?𝑖 
𝛿𝑌
𝛿𝑥𝑖
 
C -17.77 NA NA 
PRIVATEVC 1.84 0.77 12.7% 
CLUSTER 0.65 0.84 4.5% 
PROXIMITY 1.54 0.70 10.7% 
HIGHGWT 0.37 0.70 2.6% 
2002EXIT -3.06 0.07 -21.2% 
2008EXIT -0.71 0.11 -4.9% 
DURATION -0.17 4.72 -1.2% 
SIZE 1.08 16.86 7.4% 
EBITMARGIN 0.01 -16.38 0.1% 
ROE -0.04 -2.33 -0.3% 
    
?̂?𝑖 0.93   
1 − ?̂?𝑖 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
     
 
Investments in EFs located in entrepreneurial clusters are 4.5% more likely to be exited as a 
return generating exit compared to investments in EFs outside said clusters. This relationship 
is expected however it is not statistically significant. 
 
Investments where the VC and EF are situated close to each other are 10.7% more likely to be 
exited as a return generating exit compared to investments where VC and EF are far apart. 
This relationship is expected and significant to the 5%-level. 
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5. Analysis 
 
The table below summarizes the expected and observed relationships from the final regression 
model. The table also shows whether or not the relationship is significant on the 1%, 5% and 
10%-level respectively shown as ***, ** and *.  
Table 4. Summary of results 
Variable Significance Expected relationship Observed relationship 
Private VC ** Positive Positive 
Cluster - Positive Positive 
Proximity ** Positive Positive 
HighGwt - Positive Positive 
2002Exit *** Negative Negative 
2008Exit - Negative Negative 
Duration - Positive Negative 
Size *** Positive Positive 
EBIT margin * Positive Positive 
ROE - Positive Negative 
 
The results show that all significant variables are in line with what was expected considering 
previous research. This primarily suggests that the same factors determine success in Sweden 
as internationally. Being more specific and going slightly more in depth, there are several 
differences between the Swedish market and its international counterparts worth considering. 
 
The results clearly suggests that the IPO as a possible exit outcome is not to be considered as 
important for Swedish VC investments as it is for investments in Anglo-Saxon countries 
where the equity markets are much more prominent sources of financing than what is the case 
in Sweden. Only 2% of the observed exits were IPOs which can be compared to 27% both in 
the US and Canada according to Cumming & MacIntosh (2003a). This is not entirely 
surprising as it has previously been suggested that European markets are less liquid in a sense, 
and more reliant on bank financing as discussed by Povaly (2006) and Nobes & Parker, 
(2012). This result however has implications for the efficiency of the Swedish VC industry. It 
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has been the historical belief that IPOs has been driving the evolution of the VC industry but 
the almost negligible share of IPOs included in this study would suggest that there has to be 
other drivers for the Swedish industry. What those drivers are is beyond the scope of this 
study but it is fair to assume that the governmental intervention in the Swedish VC industry 
has to some extent driven the evolution of the industry, an argument supported by the findings 
by Jeng & Wells (2000). Another factor likely to contribute to the small share of IPOs is the 
possibility of lock-up clauses, something that we understand is included in basically all 
contracts between EFs and VCs. These clauses restrict the VC from exiting their investment 
during a pre-determined period after the IPO and it thus likely implies that the possibility of 
finding a full exit by IPO on the Swedish market is very low.   
 
The division of the observed exits is as mentioned highly biased towards trade sales and 
write-offs. Comparing the results to that of Cumming & MacIntosh (2003a) one can notice 
that the combined share of trade sales and IPOs in the US (54%) and in Canada (39%) is 
fairly similar to the combined share of 52% observed in this study. This would further 
strengthen the argument that trade sales are to be considered the most important exit for 
Swedish VC firms as the relative share of trade sales within the numbers given above is 50% 
in the US, 31% in Canada and 96% in Sweden. 
 
Looking at the descriptive statistics illustrated in Table 1, and specifically the control 
variables, it is possible to note that the results are very much in line with what has previously 
been found out to determine successful exit outcomes. The low frequency of some exit routes 
however limits the statistical power of these relationships but the results indicate that the 
highest quality EFs exit by IPO and the worst quality EFs are often written-offs, looking at for 
instance the size of assets, EBIT margin and ROE. 
 
The time period used in this study is also important to consider, given that the entire period 
has been heavily influenced by economic turmoil, which also impacted the VC industry 
significantly as it is dependent on a well-functioning economy and strong equity markets to 
facilitate exits. The fact that only the 2002 dummy variable turned out significant can likely 
be explained by considering the length of impact of an economic crisis and the lagged nature 
of most markets, where the initial impact can be experienced a few month after the event 
occurred.   
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The results show that investments done by PVCs are 12.7% more likely to be exited as a 
successful exit compared to investments by GVCs. This suggests that the knowledge and 
experience of PVCs is greater than that of GVCs, which implies that the assistance provided 
from VC to EF is improved if the investing firm is a PVC. This relates to what Cumming & 
Johan (2008) defines as GVCs being restricted by statutory covenants that determines the 
investment focus of the firm, something that can lead to GVCs making investments that are 
not ideal from a pure VC perspective. This can be interpreted as that GVCs risk lacking the 
necessary knowledge and experience when making investments and instead basing 
investments on the covenants that determine their investment scope.  
 
The certification effect is also likely to be stronger in PVCs related to GVCs. This due to the 
fact that GVC is in Sweden considered to be market supporting. Assuming well-functioning 
markets, such a statement basically implies that GVCs are investing in the EFs that are left 
over, after the PVCs have screened the markets and chosen the best prospects. If such is the 
case, the certification effect of being backed by a PVC would be strong whereas being backed 
by a GVC actually could signal the direct opposite, weakness. Using the same argument, the 
results can be interpreted as that the Swedish GVCs successfully acts as a complement to the 
market. Given the low emphasis on generating economic returns, it would be highly 
surprising if the GVCs could match PVCs in terms of performing successful exits. Thus, the 
fact that GVCs are less likely to perform successful exits could mean that they have 
succeeded, which of course is somewhat of a paradox. 
 
Furthermore, if the GVCs had in fact been able to match the success of PVCs, one could also 
have suspected that crowding out effects were present. Given the low share of GVC exits 
(23%) compared to the situation in Europe where 35% of the contributed funds to the VC 
industry come from GVCs (EVCA, 2014) there is little evidence of crowding out effects on 
the Swedish market. The low share is actually surprising given the time period of the study. 
Historically the Swedish government has used VC as a tool in times of trouble, something that 
suggests that the 23% observed in this study should have been slightly higher if that pattern 
would have been followed. 
 
The monitoring and control should also be performed better by PVCs compared to GVCs. 
One argument to support that is the lack of a profit orientation in many GVCs. The lacking of 
such an orientation might imply that the accountability for financial performance is lower in 
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EFs backed by GVCs compared to PVCs, who have pressure to generate return on the funds 
investors’ equity. The contractual aspect of the monitoring and control falls outside the scope 
of this study and can therefore not be analyzed in a thorough way, although it is the authors’ 
belief that contractual covenants are stricter when dealing with a PVC compared to a GVC 
which also would imply that the PVCs ability to monitor would be better compared to the 
GVCs’. 
 
The impact of being situated in an entrepreneurial cluster surprisingly turned out not to have a 
significant impact on the exit outcome of the investment. The results of the marginal effects 
calculations suggest that EFs situated in clusters are 4.5% more likely to achieve successful 
exits, although the model cannot reject the possibility of the relationship being 0 which 
implies that the statistical power is limited. One potential explanation to this is the 
construction of the variable itself and in particular the assumption that all EFs situated in 
Stockholm are part of what can be called the Stockholm-cluster. One could argue that 
Stockholm instead of being one single cluster, comprise of several smaller clusters. This 
could, although not necessarily, give different results in line with what was expected.  
 
It was our belief, and still is that the approach used however is correct and gives a fair view of 
the Swedish market. The reasoning behind this is simple and is related to the very 
fundamental aspects of clusters. Clusters function by lowering barriers to entry primarily 
through facilitating efficient active assistance from VC to EF and by making the monitoring 
and control simple as the two parties are situated close to each other. The impact of these 
fundamental aspects of the relationship between VC and EF should thus not be limited by the 
fact that an EF might be situated a five minute drive from what has been determined a cluster. 
This theory, originally presented by Michael Porter is prominent, and it is undoubtedly 
possible to observe such patterns in Sweden. However, it is not surprising that the impact of 
the value-added activates conducted by VCs, thought to improve the likelihood of achieving a 
successful exit, are performed substantially better within clusters whose definition and scope 
are somewhat arbitrary set. 
 
Another potential explanation for the weak statistical strength is the fact that the cluster theory 
mainly focus on the generation of new firms rather than the success of existing ones. Looking 
at the share of exits where EFs has been situated in clusters (84%), it is reasonable to assume 
that clusters in fact facilitate the emergence of new firms, as discussed earlier. However, 
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comparing the relative share of trade sales where EFs has been situated (85%) to write-offs 
where EFs has been situated (82%) within the sample it is further reasonable to assume that 
the benefits in terms of generating a successful exit are limited at best, with only 3%-points 
separating the two exit routes. 
 
Related to clustering is the aspect of proximity. Proximity, unlike clusters, proved to have a 
significant positive impact on the likelihood of achieving a successful exit. Investments where 
the VC and the EF are situated within 100 km of each other are 10.7% more likely to achieve 
a successful exit compared to investments where VC and EF are far apart. This is as 
mentioned previously expected and it can likely be explained by considering the three areas 
where VCs add value to its investees. The impact of active assistance is likely improved if the 
VC can take a hands-on approach with the EF, something that in turn should be simpler if the 
distance between the parties is moderate. Lerner (1995) for instance found that proximity 
increases the likelihood of VCs serving on the board of EFs, which should benefit the EF 
because of the knowledge and experience shared between VC and EF at such meetings. 
Furthermore, proximity should imply that the impact of assistance should be improved. In 
cases where VC and EF are close, the VC likely has more contacts for instance to share 
(suppliers, buyers, consultants etc.) compared to situations where they are far apart. 
 
The impact of certification is not axiomatically improved as proximity increases. The reason 
for this is that the certification effect relates to the pedigree of the VC firm. Thus, this effect 
should be unrelated to the geographical relation between VC and EF. 
 
Finally, the monitoring and control is also likely to be improved as proximity increases, even 
though the control relationship is usually contractually determined. This since, as with 
assistance, the VC is likely to be more hands-on if the EF is close by. 
 
With the above discussion in mind it is important to remember the large impact of the 
inclusion of the control variables. This obviously suggests that EF quality and size remain the 
strongest drivers of success. However, we have shown that both the nature of the VC itself 
(being private rather than governmental) and the proximity between VC and EF can improve 
the quality of the EF and thus improve the likelihood of achieving a successful exit.    
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6. Conclusions 
 
The central question of this study was if and how exit outcomes for Swedish VC investments 
can be explained by characteristics of the Swedish VC market. Three key factors were 
identified and analyzed: PVC versus GVC firms, entrepreneurial clusters and the proximity 
between VC and EF. 
 
Our results indicate that investments being conducted by PVCs and investments where the VC 
and EF are within 100 km of each other are associated with increased likelihood of the 
investment being exited successfully. Furthermore, there is weak evidence that suggests that 
EFs located in entrepreneurial clusters also are associated with increased likelihood of 
success. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. 
 
The results also suggest that the funding of the Swedish VC market is highly driven by 
governmental intervention rather than the opportunity of achieving an IPO, which has been 
considered to be the strongest driver of the US VC industry. This implies both that the 
Swedish VC industry is less efficient than some international counterparts, but also that it has 
historically served and will surely continue to serve as an important catalyst for the Swedish 
economy. 
 
The results, as mentioned, suggest that PVCs are superior GVCs in terms of achieving 
successful exits. This however does not mean that the Swedish system for GVCs is broken, 
instead it could imply the contrary. The Swedish GVCs have been assigned a role of being 
complements to the market, a role that they have recently been criticized for not fulfilling 
(Riksrevisionen, 2014). Such a role, in combination with the lack of a profit orientation 
should imply that GVCs will perform less successful exits than PVCs. However, the low 
frequency of exits outside entrepreneurial clusters (16%) suggests that the geographical aspect 
of being a complement to the market is an area where the Swedish government and the GVCs 
can improve. To fully understand the role of Swedish GVCs one would have to dig much 
deeper, however these results have implications despite their general nature. The current 
situation has led to, and will continue to lead to that GVC backed investments are more likely 
to fail than its private counterparts. It is up to the Swedish government to figure out is this is 
acceptable or not. 
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We further find weak evidence suggesting that EFs in clusters perform better exits than EFs 
outside clusters. Previous research (Lerner, 1996) has found clusters to have a positive 
relationship with success. One explanation of our findings could be the timing of this study. 
During the early 2000s’ many ICT companies went bankrupt when the “dot-com” bubble 
burst. This undoubtedly struck clusters hard as many such companies were located in the 
Stockholm region at the time. The same logic can be applied to the recent financial crisis, 
which surely struck high-risk-high-reward types of firms operating in clusters in a significant 
way. Clusters will surely continue to be an important feature of the Swedish entrepreneurial 
climate, however our results suggest that investing firms should focus more on the EF and its 
qualities rather than superficial factors such as whether or not it is located in a cluster. 
 
Proximity also turned out to have a significant positive effect on the success of VC 
investments. This likely is due to the very fundamental aspects of the value-add activities 
conducted by VCs to improve and certify the EFs quality. Given the evolution of the Swedish 
countryside this implies that VCs will need to adapt as previously rural areas become 
increasingly more urban which in turn sparks entrepreneurship. Being there, present on a local 
level should thus be something to consider for VC firms in the near future. 
 
6.1 Suggestions for future research   
 
After finishing this study we can conclude that we managed to bring insight to aspects of the 
Swedish VC industry, previously unexplored in this manner. Despite this, there are a few 
angles that we did not manage to explore and that make excellent leads for future research.  
 
First, conducting a multinomial logistic regression of all five possible exit outcomes can 
likely improve our understanding of the factors that make the Swedish market unique. This 
would require a large dataset stretching back a long time, which unfortunately implied it was 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Second, focusing in on the Swedish government’s VC intervention is an area that during the 
process of writing this thesis sparked our interest. Analyzing whether or not the government 
fulfills its role as a complement to the market would be a very interesting angle that surely 
could have implications for future national policy in this area. 
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Appendix 1: Sample 
  VC firm EF firm Exit Investment Exit 
1. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB 13TH LAB AB TS 2012 2014 
2. BIOLIN MEDICAL AB ALCODIA AB TS 2000 2004 
3. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB ALCODIA AB TS 2000 2004 
4. ACR CAPITAL AB ALICE SYSTEMS AB TS 2002 2004 
5. AFFÄRSSTRATEGERNA I SVERIGE AB ALPHA HELIX AB IPO 2001 2010 
6. ALMI INVEST AB ANACATUM DESIGN AB TS 2012 2014 
7. LINKMED AB ANAMAR AB SBO 2008 2013 
8. BURE EQUITY AB APPELBERG PUBLISHING GROUP AB TS 2001 2006 
9. NORDSTJERNAN VENTURES AB APTILO NETWORKS AB SBO 2003 2011 
10. SKANDITEK INDUSTRIFÖRVALTNING AB APTILO NETWORKS AB SBO 2003 2011 
11. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB AREXIS AB TS 2003 2005 
12. STOCKHOLM INNOVATION & GROWTH CAPITAL AB AUREOLA SWEDISH ENGINEERING AB LIQ 2006 2010 
13. LEDSTIERNAN AB AVISATOR AB MBB 2000 2001 
14. HEALTHCAP AB BIOLIPOX AB TS 2001 2007 
15. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB BIOMAIN AB MBB 2008 2008 
16. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB BIOMAIN AB MBB 2008 2008 
17. ALMI INVEST AB BIOVATOR AB LIQ 2008 2012 
18. LINKMED AB BIOVATOR AB LIQ 2008 2012 
19. IT PROVIDER BLUEFACTORY AB TS 2000 2003 
20. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB BYTEACTIVE AB LIQ 2008 2014 
21. STOCKHOLM INNOVATION & GROWTH CAPITAL AB BYTEACTIVE AB LIQ 2008 2014 
22. KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB CALABAR AB LIQ 2008 2013 
23. LEDSTIERNAN AB CARETEC AB LIQ 2000 2003 
24. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG CARMEN SYSTEMS AB TS 2000 2006 
25. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB CARTELA AB TS 2003 2008 
26. VOLITO INNOVATION AB CARTELA AB TS 2003 2008 
27. BIOLIN MEDICAL AB CAVIDI AB LIQ 2000 2006 
28. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB CAVIDI AB LIQ 2000 2006 
29. LEDSTIERNAN AB CCNOX LIQ 2000 2003 
30. BARNWIK AB CELLARTIS AB TS 2005 2011 
31. CATELLA AB CELLARTIS AB TS 2005 2011 
32. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG CELLARTIS AB TS 2005 2011 
33. TEXCEL INTERNATIONAL AB CELLARTIS AB TS 2005 2011 
34. ORESUND CELLTRIBE AB LIQ 2000 2001 
35. LEDSTIERNAN AB COLUMBITECH AB MBB 2000 2013 
36. PELAGO VENTURE PARTNERS AB COLUMBITECH AB SBO 2000 2008 
37. NOVESTRA AB COMINTELL HOLDING AB MBB 2000 2002 
38. MALMÖHUS INVEST AB CONNECTBLUE AB SBO* 2000 2006 
39. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB CONVENEER AB TS 2009 2010 
40. STOCKHOLM INNOVATION & GROWTH CAPITAL AB CORTUS AB TS 2009 2012 
41. INLANDSINNOVATION AB CPD CENTER AB LIQ* 2012 2014 
42. VITA NOVA VENTURES AB DATAREAL KARLSTAD AB MBB 2004 2005 
43. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB DECUMA AB TS 2003 2004 
44. VISIONALIS AB DECUMA AB TS 2001 2004 
45. VOLITO INNOVATION AB DECUMA AB TS 2001 2004 
46. ARGNOR WIRELESS VENTURES ADVISORS AB DIGITAL ROUTE AB SBO 2002 2008 
47. IT PROVIDER DRUTT CORPORATION TS 2004 2007 
48. LITORINA KAPITAL MANAGEMENT AB DYNAMED AB LIQ 2000 2005 
49. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB EFFPOWER AB LIQ* 2003 2012 
50. VOLVO GROUP VENTURE CAPITAL AB EFFPOWER AB LIQ* 2003 2012 
51. LEDSTIERNAN AB EKONOMI24 AB SBO 2000 2005 
52. IT PROVIDER ENVOX GROUP AB TS 2002 2008 
53. NORTHZONE VENTURES AB ENVOX GROUP AB TS 2002 2008 
54. SERVISEN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AB ENVOX GROUP AB TS 2002 2008 
55. KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB ERIBIS PHARMACEUTICALS AB LIQ 2010 2011 
56. NOVESTRA AB ERICSSON MULTILET AB MBB 2000 2002 
57. INNOVATIONSBRON AB FLATWALLET AB TS 2012 2013 
58. LEDSTIERNAN AB FM FONDMARKNADEN AB MBB 2001 2003 
59. B-BUSINESS PARTNERS FRONTVILLE AB TS 2000 2003 
60. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB FRONTVILLE AB TS 2000 2003 
61. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB FRONTVILLE AB TS 2000 2003 
62. FORSKARPATENT I SYD AB GALECTO BIOTECH AB TS 2012 2014 
63. ARGNOR WIRELESS VENTURES ADVISORS AB GENERAL WIRELESS SCANDINAVIA AB TS 2001 2008 
64. FÖRETAGSBYGGARNA AB GENERAL WIRELESS SCANDINAVIA AB TS 2003 2008 
65. HEALTHCAP AB GLOBAL GENOMICS AB TS 2000 2005 
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66. KAROLINSKA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AB GLOBAL GENOMICS AB LIQ 2002 2006 
67. MALMSTEN INVEST AB GLOBAL GENOMICS AB LIQ 2002 2006 
68. H&B CAPITAL GYROS AB SBO 2001 2009 
69. HEALTHCAP AB GYROS AB SBO 2001 2009 
70. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG GYROS AB SBO 2001 2009 
71. LITORINA KAPITAL MANAGEMENT AB HAPAX INFORMATION SYSTEMS AB LIQ 2000 2002 
72. ARGNOR WIRELESS VENTURES ADVISORS AB HOTSIP AB TS 2001 2006 
73. LEDSTIERNAN AB HOTSIP AB TS 2002 2006 
74. STOCKHOLM INNOVATION & GROWTH CAPITAL AB HULU SWEDEN AB TS 2008 2008 
75. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB IBX GROUP AB TS 2001 2010 
76. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB ILLUMINATE LABS AB TS 2005 2010 
77. VOLVO GROUP VENTURE CAPITAL AB ILLUMINATE LABS AB TS 2005 2010 
78. KAROLINSKA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AB IMED AB LIQ 2007 2011 
79. LINKMED AB IMED AB LIQ 2007 2011 
80. TRANSFERATOR AB IMODULES AB TS 2011 2014 
81. LEDSTIERNAN AB INCOMIT AB TS 2000 2004 
82. KAROLINSKA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AB INDEPENDENT PHARMACEUTICA AB LIQ 2004 2011 
83. CATELLA AB INTERNET 5 AB TS 2000 2004 
84. INDUSTRIVARDEN AB INTERPEAK AB SBO 2000 2004 
85. LEDSTIERNAN AB INTERPEAK AB TS 2004 2006 
86. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB INTERPEAK AB TS 2002 2006 
87. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB IPUNPLUGGED AB LIQ 2001 2008 
88. LEDSTIERNAN AB IPUNPLUGGED AB LIQ 2000 2008 
89. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG ISCONOVA AB TS 2008 2013 
90. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB JENSEN DEVICES AB TS 2007 2012 
91. MIDROC NEW TECHNOLOGY AB JENSEN DEVICES AB TS 2007 2012 
92. VOLVO GROUP VENTURE CAPITAL AB JENSEN DEVICES AB TS 2007 2012 
93. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG JOLIFE AB TS 2003 2011 
94. NEW SCIENCE SVENSKA AB KAROCELL TISSUE ENGINEERING AB LIQ* 2004 2010 
95. RITE INTERNET VENTURES AB KLIKKI AB TS 2008 2012 
96. SJATTE AP-FONDEN KREATEL COMMUNICATIONS AB TS 2000 2006 
97. BURE EQUITY AB KREATEL COMMUNICATIONS AB TS 2000 2006 
98. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG KREATEL COMMUNICATIONS AB TS 2000 2006 
99. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB KREATEL COMMUNICATIONS AB TS 2000 2006 
100. LEDSTIERNAN AB LINKPOOL AB LIQ 2000 2001 
101. CIMON MEDICAL AB LIPID TECHNOLOGIES PROVIDER AB TS 2003 2006 
102. FÖRETAGSBYGGARNA AB LUDESI AB LIQ 2004 2010 
103. SJATTE AP-FONDEN LUDESI AB LIQ 2004 2010 
104. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB LYNGBOX MEDIA AB LIQ* 2007 2012 
105. PRIVEQ PARTNERS AB M2 ENGINEERING AB LIQ* 2004 2010 
106. AFFÄRSSTRATEGERNA I SVERIGE AB MAINBOX LIQ 2000 2003 
107. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG MEDEIKONOS AB LIQ* 2000 2005 
108. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB MEDEIKONOS AB LIQ* 2000 2005 
109. IT PROVIDER MEDINSITE AB LIQ* 2000 2008 
110. HEALTHCAP AB MELACURE THERAPEUTICS AB LIQ* 2000 2004 
111. NOVARE KAPITAL AB MELACURE THERAPEUTICS AB LIQ* 2000 2004 
112. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG MGAGE SYSTEMS AB TS 2000 2001 
113. CIMON MEDICAL AB MICROMUSCLE AB LIQ 2002 2008 
114. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB MICROMUSCLE AB LIQ 2002 2008 
115. HEALTHCAP AB MILLICORE AB SBO* 2003 2009 
116. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB MILLICORE AB SBO* 2003 2009 
117. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB MITRIONICS AB TS 2005 2010 
118. TEKNOSEED AB MITRIONICS AB TS 2005 2010 
119. HOPPENSTEDT BONNIER INVEST AB MOMAIL AB LIQ 2008 2011 
120. SJATTE AP-FONDEN MOMAIL AB LIQ 2008 2011 
121. INLANDSINNOVATION AB MOVINTO FUN AB MBB 
 
2013 
 
2014 
122. AFFÄRSSTRATEGERNA I SVERIGE AB MUSICBRIGADE AB LIQ* 2000 2008 
123. ALFRED BERG HOLDING AB MYSQL AB TS 2001 2008 
124. SCOPE CAPITAL ADVISORY AB MYSQL AB TS 2001 2008 
125. TEXCEL INTERNATIONAL AB MYSQL AB TS 2001 2008 
126. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB NANOFACTORY INSTRUMENTS AB LIQ* 2007 2014 
127. NORTHZONE VENTURES AB NANOFREEZE TECHNOLOGIES LUND AB LIQ* 2007 2012 
128. TEKNOSEED AB NANOFREEZE TECHNOLOGIES LUND AB LIQ* 2007 2012 
129. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB NANORADIO AB TS 2009 2012 
130. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB NANORADIO AB TS 2005 2012 
131. AB CHALMERSINVEST NANOXIS AB LIQ* 2003 2011 
132. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB NANOXIS AB LIQ* 2003 2011 
133. GU HOLDING AB NANOXIS AB LIQ* 2003 2011 
134. AFFÄRSSTRATEGERNA I SVERIGE AB NETBABY WORLD MBB 2001 2002 
135. HEALTHCAP AB NEURONOVA AB TS 2000 2012 
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136. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB NEURONOVA AB TS 2003 2012 
137. PARTNERINVEST OVRE NORRLAND AB NORDIC RIVER SOFTWARE AB LIQ* 2010 2013 
138. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG NORDNAV TECHNOLOGIES AB TS 2005 2007 
139. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB OPTILLION AB LIQ 2000 2005 
140. INNOVATIONSBRON AB OREXPLORE AB TS 2011 2013 
141. HEALTHCAP AB PERSONAL CHEMISTRY AB TS 2000 2003 
142. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB PERSONAL CHEMISTRY AB TS 2000 2003 
143. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB PERSONAL CHEMISTRY AB TS 2000 2003 
144. STARTUPFACTORY AB PICOFUN AB TS 2000 2002 
145. ALMI INVEST AB POCKET MEDIA GROUP AB TS 2012 2013 
146. SJATTE AP-FONDEN POLARICA AB SBO 2006 2010 
147. INNOVATIONSBRON AB POLYSCORP SYSTEM AB LIQ* 2011 2012 
148. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB PROJECTPLACE INTERNATIONAL AB TS 2001 2014 
149. INVESTMENT AB LATOUR PROSTALUND AB SBO 2001 2006 
150. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG PROXIMION FIBRE OPTICS AB LIQ 2001 2003 
151. NOVARE KAPITAL AB QEYTON SYSTEMS AB TS 2000 2000 
152. RATOS AB Q-LABS TS 2000 2004 
153. INNOVATIONSBRON AB QUBULUS AB LIQ* 2012 2014 
154. CAPMAN AB QUICKCOOL AB TS 2006 2012 
155. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB QUIQOM SYSTEMS AB LIQ 2009 2009 
156. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB RADIANS INNOVA AB LIQ* 2002 2004 
157. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG RADIANS INNOVA AB LIQ* 2002 2004 
158. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB RADIANS INNOVA AB LIQ* 2002 2004 
159. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG RED MESSAGE AB LIQ 2000 2002 
160. DELPHI CAPITAL REDCYBER AB LIQ 2001 2002 
161. NORDIC WIRELESS AB REDCYBER AB LIQ 2000 2002 
162. LEDSTIERNAN AB REPEATIT AB TS 2001 2009 
163. FÖRETAGSBYGGARNA AB REPLISAURUS TECHNOLOGIES AB LIQ* 2004 2013 
164. SJATTE AP-FONDEN REPLISAURUS TECHNOLOGIES AB LIQ* 2004 2013 
165. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG SAFELOGIC AB TS 2003 2004 
166. MALMSTEN INVEST AB SAFELOGIC AB TS 2003 2004 
167. NORTHZONE VENTURES AB SAFELOGIC AB TS 2003 2004 
168. CATELLA AB SATSAFE MLS AB LIQ 2000 2002 
169. DELPHI CAPITAL SATSAFE MLS AB LIQ 2001 2002 
170. H&Q TECHNOLOGY SATSAFE MLS AB LIQ 2000 2002 
171. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB SCALADO AB TS 2004 2012 
172. TEKNOSEED AB SCALADO AB TS 2004 2012 
173. SLOTTSBACKEN VENTURE CAPITAL AB SECODE AB TS* 2000 2010 
174. LITORINA KAPITAL MANAGEMENT AB SENSISTOR AB TS 2000 2006 
175. POD HOLDING AB SERVICEFACTORY SF AB TS 2004 2007 
176. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB SILICON CONSTRUCTION SWEDEN AB LIQ* 2004 2009 
177. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB SILICON CONSTRUCTION SWEDEN AB LIQ* 2004 2009 
178. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG SILICON CONSTRUCTION SWEDEN AB LIQ* 2004 2009 
179. SCOPE CAPITAL ADVISORY AB SILICON CONSTRUCTION SWEDEN AB LIQ* 2004 2009 
180. ALMI INVEST AB SIMATIC AB TS 2009 2013 
181. COACH & CAPITAL NORDIC 1 AB SIMATIC AB TS 2009 2013 
182. CELL NETWORK INNOVATION AB SNAPSEND LIQ 2000 2002 
183. WIKOW INVEST AB SNAPSEND LIQ 2000 2002 
184. EKSTRANDA AB SOFT CAPITAL INVESTMENT AB SBO 2006 2009 
185. LEDSTIERNAN AB SOFT CAPITAL INVESTMENT AB SBO 2006 2009 
186. CAPMAN AB SPINTOP NETSOLUTION AB TS 2006 2008 
187. ZODIAK VENTURE CAPITAL AB SPIREA AB LIQ 2000 2004 
188. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG SPOTFIRE HOLDINGS INC TS 2000 2007 
189. LITORINA KAPITAL MANAGEMENT AB SWE DISH WAHLBERG & SELIN AB TS 2000 2007 
190. NORDIC WIRELESS AB SWE DISH WAHLBERG & SELIN AB TS 2000 2007 
191. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG SYNTENSIA AB TS 2008 2010 
192. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG SYNTUNE AB TS 2004 2009 
193. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB TAIL-F SYSTEMS AB TS 2005 2014 
194. SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB TELELOGIC AB TS 2005 2007 
195. ERICSSON BUSINESS INNOVATION AB TERRAPLAY SYSTEMS AB TS 2001 2007 
196. IT PROVIDER TERRAPLAY SYSTEMS AB TS 2001 2007 
197. LEDSTIERNAN AB TICKETANYWHERE LIQ 2001 2002 
198. ACR CAPITAL AB TIFIC AB TS 2002 2011 
199. SLOTTSBACKEN VENTURE CAPITAL AB TIFIC AB TS 2001 2011 
200. TELIA BUSINESS INNOVATION AB TIFIC AB TS 2002 2011 
201. SJATTE AP-FONDEN TODOS DATA SYSTEMS AB TS 2000 2010 
202. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB TONIUM AB LIQ 2008 2010 
203. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB TRANSIC AB TS 2008 2011 
204. MIDROC NEW TECHNOLOGY AB TRANSIC AB TS 2008 2011 
205. VOLVO GROUP VENTURE CAPITAL AB TRANSIC AB TS 2008 2011 
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206. POD HOLDING AB TRANSMODE SYSTEMS AB IPO 2003 2011 
207. EKONORD INVEST AB UMBIO AB LIQ* 2012 2014 
208. NORRLANDSFONDEN UMBIO AB LIQ* 2011 2014 
209. PARTNERINVEST OVRE NORRLAND AB UMBIO AB LIQ* 2011 2014 
210. SPARBANKSSTIFTELSEN NORRLANDS RISKKAPITALSTIFTELSE UMBIO AB LIQ* 2011 2014 
211. LEDSTIERNAN AB WAZOO HOLDING AB (KATSHING AB) SBO 2007 2012 
212. AFFÄRSSTRATEGERNA I SVERIGE AB WEB UPDATE SBO 2000 2007 
213. ALMI INVEST AB VICI INDUSTRI AB TS 2007 2014 
214. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB VICI INDUSTRI AB TS 2007 2014 
215. CREANDUM ADVISOR AB VIDEOPLAZA AB TS 2008 2014 
216. NORTHZONE VENTURES AB VIDEOPLAZA AB TS 2010 2014 
217. AFFÄRSSTRATEGERNA I SVERIGE AB WIDERMIND AB LIQ 2000 2005 
218. BRAINHEART CAPITAL AB WIRELESS MAINGATE AB TS 2001 2014 
219. CATELLA AB WIRELESS MAINGATE AB TS 2002 2014 
220. MVI EQUITY AB WIRELESS MAINGATE AB TS 2002 2014 
221. BRAINHEART CAPITAL AB WIRELESSCAR TS 2001 2008 
222. LEDSTIERNAN AB VOICE PROVIDER SWEDEN AB TS 2001 2006 
223. HEALTHCAP AB XCOUNTER AB IPO 2002 2007 
224. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB XCOUNTER AB IPO 2002 2007 
225. STARTUPFACTORY AB XELERATED PACKET DEVICES AB TS 2001 2012 
226. BRAINHEART CAPITAL AB XPEDIO AB LIQ 2000 2002 
227. PEDAL VENTURES XPEDIO AB LIQ 2000 2002 
228. SEGULAH AB XPEDIO AB LIQ 2000 2002 
229. KTH SEED CAPITAL ZEALCORE EMBEDDED SOLUTIONS AB TS 2004 2008 
230. INDUSTRIFONDEN AB ZIMPL AB LIQ* 2011 2014 
231. MST VENTURE AB ZIMPL AB LIQ* 2011 2014 
232. INNOVATIONSKAPITAL MANAGEMENT I GÖTEBORG ÅMIC AB TS 2002 2008 
233. INVESTOR GROWTH CAPITAL AB ÅMIC AB TS 2002 2008 
 
* = Conclusive information is missing but there is strong support to assume the given exit 
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Appendix 2: Governmental VCs 
Source: Riskrevisionen (2014), Figure 4, pp. 30 
Operating under the Department of Finance: 
Fourtiertrasform AB 
Sjätte AP-Fonden 
- Krigskassa Blekinge 
- Jönköping Business Development 
- Lannebo Microcap 
- Lannebo Småbolag 
- SEB Micro Cap 
Operating under the Department of Education: 
KTH Chalmers Capital (together with Industrifonden) 
KTH Seed Capital (together with Industrifonden) 
Ca 15 University holding companies 
Luminova AB 
Uminova AB 
Operating under the Department of Industry 
Industrifonden 
- Malmöhus Invest AB 
- Investa Företagskapital AB 
Norrlandsfonden 
- Partnerinvest Övre Norrland AB (together with Almi Invest AB) 
- Arctic Business Incubator AB 
- Norrsådd Holding AB (together with Industrifonden) 
Almi Företagspartner AB 
- Almi Invest AB 
o Regional offices 
- Almi Innovationsbron 
o Teknoseed I AB 
o Forskarpatent I Syd AB 
 Innovationspatent Sverige AB 
o Sydsvensk Entreprenörsfond AB 
- 16 regional subsidiaries 
Inlandsinnovation AB 
- Mittkapital 
- Startkapital i Norr 
- Ekoväst 
- Ekonord  
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Appendix 3: Model adequacy 
Hoshmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test: 
Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation for Binary Specification    
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Tests      
Equation: EQ1       
Date: 05/12/15   Time: 13:30      
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties)    
         
              Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.0970 0.5925 8 7.55700 4 4.44300 12 0.07014 
2 0.6046 0.7576 3 3.56431 9 8.43569 12 0.12709 
3 0.7619 0.8357 1 2.58339 12 10.4166 13 1.21116 
4 0.8360 0.8886 4 1.60605 8 10.3940 12 4.11977 
5 0.8917 0.9311 1 1.10474 12 11.8953 13 0.01085 
6 0.9354 0.9552 1 0.64465 11 11.3554 12 0.20700 
7 0.9601 0.9741 0 0.38071 12 11.6193 12 0.39319 
8 0.9741 0.9799 0 0.29227 13 12.7077 13 0.29899 
9 0.9806 0.9867 0 0.19191 12 11.8081 12 0.19503 
10 0.9870 0.9987 0 0.07499 13 12.9250 13 0.07543 
         
           Total 18 18.0000 106 106.000 124 6.70864 
         
         H-L Statistic 6.7086  Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.5684  
Andrews Statistic 55.3159  Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0000  
         
         
 
 
 
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation: 
Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation for Binary Specification    
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Tests      
Equation: EQ1       
Date: 05/12/15   Time: 13:30      
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties)    
         
              Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.0970 0.5925 8 7.55700 4 4.44300 12 0.07014 
2 0.6046 0.7576 3 3.56431 9 8.43569 12 0.12709 
3 0.7619 0.8357 1 2.58339 12 10.4166 13 1.21116 
4 0.8360 0.8886 4 1.60605 8 10.3940 12 4.11977 
5 0.8917 0.9311 1 1.10474 12 11.8953 13 0.01085 
6 0.9354 0.9552 1 0.64465 11 11.3554 12 0.20700 
7 0.9601 0.9741 0 0.38071 12 11.6193 12 0.39319 
8 0.9741 0.9799 0 0.29227 13 12.7077 13 0.29899 
9 0.9806 0.9867 0 0.19191 12 11.8081 12 0.19503 
10 0.9870 0.9987 0 0.07499 13 12.9250 13 0.07543 
         
           Total 18 18.0000 106 106.000 124 6.70864 
         
         H-L Statistic 6.7086  Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.5684  
Andrews Statistic 55.3159  Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0000  
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrix 
 
 PRIVATEVC CLUSTER PROXIMITY HIGHGWT _2002EXIT _2008EXIT DURATION SIZE EBITMARGIN ROE 
           
           
PRIVATEVC  1.000000  0.251630 -0.096386  0.093101  0.105409  0.029424  0.176794  0.094485  0.012893  0.075225 
CLUSTER  0.251630  1.000000  0.301626  0.073120  0.094040 -0.254431 -0.003250 -0.174926 -0.115733 -0.033779 
PROXIMITY -0.096386  0.301626  1.000000  0.074780  0.045720  0.062962 -0.014424 -0.147008 -0.055665 -0.064684 
HIGHGWT  0.093101  0.073120  0.074780  1.000000  0.013085  0.167106  0.075244  0.013345 -0.103566 -0.162939 
_2002EXIT  0.105409  0.094040  0.045720  0.013085  1.000000 -0.065134 -0.222631 -0.024726 -0.265366  0.018351 
_2008EXIT  0.029424 -0.254431  0.062962  0.167106 -0.065134  1.000000 -0.020344 -0.029866  0.105627 -0.050791 
DURATION  0.176794 -0.003250 -0.014424  0.075244 -0.222631 -0.020344  1.000000  0.421901  0.140137  0.176954 
SIZE  0.094485 -0.174926 -0.147008  0.013345 -0.024726 -0.029866  0.421901  1.000000  0.106419  0.254316 
EBITMARGIN  0.012893 -0.115733 -0.055665 -0.103566 -0.265366  0.105627  0.140137  0.106419  1.000000  0.121011 
ROE  0.075225 -0.033779 -0.064684 -0.162939  0.018351 -0.050791  0.176954  0.254316  0.121011  1.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
